Rich deontic logic: a preliminary study  by Brown, Mark A.
Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 19–37
www.elsevier.com/locate/jal
Rich deontic logic: a preliminary study
Mark A. Brown
Philosophy Department, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA
Abstract
This paper begins the development of new types of deontic operators, particularly ones whose
semantic characterization is based on models with forward-branching time. In such models, sup-
plemented by a choice function to model human agency, and an obligation function to introduce
normative features, it is possible to develop a rich language with a variety of obligation operators,
differing from one another in how they relate to time, and to the causal conditions, the causal conse-
quences, and the logical consequences of actions. We approach these concepts making extensive use
of the notion of a transition, as introduced in [M. Xu, Synthese 112 (1997) 137].
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1. Standard deontic logic
Early systems of deontic logic, and in particular what is commonly known as Standard
Deontic Logic, or SDL, considered the logical relations among a small subset of normative
notions—obliged, permitted, forbidden—in isolation from other notions which might com-
monly be involved in real-life discussions of our normative situations. This approach has
the advantage of giving an impressively simple system. It is easy to set forth, easy to study,
and easy to work with. It is computationally very tractable, so for use as a component of
a computer program—as part of the apparatus of some expert system, say—it would be
fairly manageable.
However this approach has the disadvantage of producing a discouragingly simplistic
system. For one thing, it omits any explicit consideration of tense and therefore cannot
readily be used to describe or to analyze the ways in which normative situations might
change over time.
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Some obligations—perhaps those captured in the ten commandments—stand forever,
and will never be completely discharged and put behind us, no matter what happens. Oth-
ers, such as the specific obligations resulting from promises and contracts or those arising
from specific commands issued by competent authority, come and go. They are incurred,
persist for a time, and are subsequently fulfilled, renegotiated, excused, mooted, or in some
other manner inactivated. SDL cannot represent such subtleties.
Moreover, SDL and its nearest relatives do not provide for explicit discussion of choices,
actions, abilities and events that might be relevant to understanding the dynamics of norma-
tive situations. By choosing to perform certain actions (borrowing a book, for example),
I may incur obligations which, by performing other actions (returning it, in this case),
I could eventually completely fulfill. Meanwhile, however, other events, not of my choos-
ing, may intervene in ways that affect my ability to fulfill my obligation. None of these
details of the normative dynamic are open to view from within the static and myopic per-
spective assumed by SDL.
The deficiencies of SDL run still deeper. It does not enable us to fully coordinate our use
of the normative portion of our vocabulary with our use of the non-normative part. When
it is possible to express the precise conditions for the fulfillment of a certain obligation,
it ought to be possible to express the claim that we have precisely that obligation. Even
leaving aside the fact that SDL has no expressions for actions, SDL fails this test. For even
if the content of an obligation is precisely expressed by some sentence A of SDL, the
corresponding obligation formulaOA of SDL will not succeed in conveying the claim that
it is precisely the truth of A that is required. Instead, as Ross’s Paradox [13] should make
us aware, it conveys only the claim that the truth of A is a necessary (though possibly not
sufficient) condition for the fulfillment of the normative demand that underlies the truth of
the formula OA.
This shortcoming is a direct result of the validity in SDL of the monotonicity rule RM
for the obligation operatorO:
(RMO) If  A → B then OA →OB.
Consider any case in which A expresses the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
fulfillment of an obligation. There will certainly be cases in which B expresses a logical
consequence of A, and among such cases there will be some in which the claim expressed
by B is not logically equivalent to the one expressed by A. In Ross’s famous example, A
expresses the claim that I mail your letter, while B expresses the entailed, but not logically
equivalent, claim that I mail your letter or burn it. But when the claim expressed by B is not
logically equivalent to that expressed by A, they cannot each be a necessary and sufficient
condition for the fulfillment of the same obligation. So unless we are prepared to adopt
the otherwise unmotivated and rather bizarre view that an obligation which can only be
fulfilled by mailing your letter automatically generates another, distinct, obligation which
can be fulfilled by burning your letter (and still another which can be fulfilled by murder-
ing your neighbor, etc.), we must decline to assume that the formula B in OB expresses
a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of any obligation. Consistency of interpretation
will then require similar restraint in the interpretation of the formula A in OA. In short,
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obligation formulas in SDL will only indicate necessary, not sufficient, conditions for the
fulfillment of obligations.
2. Richer systems of deontic logic
For such reasons as I have recounted above, we need richer systems of deontic logic—
ones whose syntax provides for discussion of actions and abilities as well as obligations,
permissions and prohibitions, and whose syntax also provides the apparatus of tense nec-
essary to track these matters over time. This will require enriching the semantics to support
the enriched syntax. Fortunately, on the semantic side, we can get vastly greater sensitiv-
ity and expressivity with only rather modest changes and additions, following pioneering
work by Belnap and co-workers (cf. [1–3,12,15]). We can think of the changes involved as
falling into three phases.
In phase 1, we:
• shift our focus from possible worlds to moments, i.e., to possible momentary states of
worlds, and
• add a temporal ordering relation among moments.
These changes make it possible to introduce tense operators. The role previously played by
worlds is now taken up by histories, i.e., by complete linear sequences of moments (mo-
mentary world-states). By permitting the temporal ordering relation to create a forward-
branching tree-structure, with histories branching into the future, we can reflect the open-
ness of the future—the opportunities for chance and choice to play a role in affecting the
future course of history. By not permitting the structure to branch backward, we can re-
flect our sense of the immutability of the past. In such a setting, it becomes appropriate to
evaluate formulas at moment/history pairs, rather than simply at moments, since histories
with different futures (and therefore different truths about the future) may branch from a
moment they hold in common. The truth about the future at that moment will then depend
on which history is under consideration, as well as on the moment in question.
In SDL, where the points of evaluation were whole worlds, propositions would be con-
strued as sets of possible worlds; now we can now give them a more fine-grained treatment
as sets of moment/history pairs. As the work of Xu [15] has begun to show, the shift from
a simple possible-worlds semantics to one based on moments and histories also makes it
possible to define processes and events, and to introduce the notion of causation.
In phase 2, we:
• acknowledge a set of agents, and
• add a choice function to reflect the choices made by agents at moments.
Given the foundation for tense logic gotten in phase 1, these additions provide the basis
for a logic of action and ability. They also make it possible to introduce causal connections,
and thus to examine the effects of actions and to represent the interactions among agents.
In the final phase, phase 3, we:
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• replace the deontic idealization relation (the deontic accessibility relation) between
worlds by a deontic function from moment/history pairs to sets of propositions.
With phase 3 completed it will again be possible to introduce the various needed deontic
notions, but now in a way that permits us to coordinate them with the tense logic and the
logics of action and ability. We can discuss the actions taken (and/or the propositions that
become true), and examine how they relate to the actions that ought to have been taken
(or the propositions that ought to have become true). SDL takes as obligatory, at a given
world, the proposition constituted by the set of that world’s ideal alternative worlds (its set
of deontically accessible worlds) and all the logical consequences of that proposition. After
completing phase three, we instead have room for a given agent, at a given moment/history
pair, to have various obligations, not necessarily logically related to one another. (Note
that there is no reason to suppose that my obligation to return a borrowed book, for exam-
ple, bears any logical relation to my obligation to fix dinner tonight.) Moreover, different
agents can have different obligations, and the same agent can have different obligations in
different circumstances.
3. Additional deontic operators
Thus far, it may seem that we have simply proposed a merger between deontic logic,
tense logic, and the logic of action, from which we perhaps hope to reap a few side benefits.
But simply adding the apparatus of tense logic and the logic of action and ability to some-
thing resembling the deontic apparatus of SDL will not satisfy all our needs. In particular,
these changes do not by themselves fully address the problem raised by Ross’s Paradox.
For that, we also need to enlarge the collection of deontic operators available. Fortunately,
this will not require any additional complexity in the models used in our semantics.
As we saw in Section 1 above, Ross’s Paradox shows that because the obligation oper-
ator in SDL is monotonic, SDL cannot express the claim that I ought to mail your letter,
understood as a claim that mailing your letter is precisely what this obligation requires.
But although it seems clearly desirable to be able to express such precise claims about our
obligations, especially in a setting which aims to provide apparatus for tracking the fulfill-
ment of obligations over time, it will not do to simply replace our monotonic operators by
precise nonmonotonic ones. It is important to have both kinds, because we do need to keep
track of the consequences of our obligations, and to acknowledge their derived normative
status. If I ought to put a stamp on your letter and mail it, it is also natural to say, and
important to be able to recognize, that I ought to mail your letter, even though I won’t have
fulfilled any obligation if I merely mail it without putting the stamp on. Mailing the letter
is a logical consequence of stamping it and mailing it.
But that’s not the end of it. There are other kinds of cases calling for what we might call
quasimonotonic operators. I can most easily explain what I mean by ‘quasimonotonic’ by
proceeding directly to some examples of such operators.
First, we need to keep track of the causal preconditions of the fulfillment of our obliga-
tions. I have an obligation to mail your letter. In the circumstances, I cannot do so without
going to the Post Office. It is then natural to say that I ought to go to the Post Office,
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because although this is not a logical consequence of fulfilling any obligation—not a log-
ically necessary condition—it is nonetheless a causally necessary condition for fulfilling
my obligation. It is important to be able to acknowledge that such an action will have a
normative role to play, even if it does not by itself fulfill any obligation. If we can intro-
duce a two-place operator ⇒
n
with a formula like A ⇒
n
B interpreted to mean that the truth
of B is (in the circumstances) a causally necessary condition for the truth of A, then we
will want some operatorOn which obeys the quasimonotonicity rule
(RQM⇒
n
) From OnA and A ⇒n B , we may infer OnB
and also a deontic transformation rule like this:
(RDT⇒
n
) From OA and A ⇒
n
B , we may infer OnB
which relates this operator to a more standard deontic operator. (Caution is needed in in-
terpreting these formulas. In particular, the formula A ⇒
n
B will not express the claim that
A’s being true is the cause, or even a cause, of the truth of B .)
The fact that it is natural to say I ought to go to the Post Office is a useful reminder,
here, but not an essential feature of the situation. Even if it were not natural to express
ourselves in this way, and thus even if we wanted to resist the idea of using the language of
obligation to express my normative relation to the task of going to the Post Office in such
circumstances, there would still be a need to provide some way of expressing this relation.
Of course we could just say that I ought to mail your letter and that in the circumstances it
is a causally necessary condition of doing so that I should go to the Post Office. But some-
times we may wish to omit any mention of mailing your letter, and merely indicate that
going to the Post Office is necessary for fulfilling my obligations, i.e., use a formula OnB
without offering any particular corresponding formula A such that OA and A ⇒
n
B . There
can be various reasons for this. One might be just a matter of focus: The important thing at
the moment is that I go to the Post Office. There are reasons why going there is important,
but the details of those reasons may be, for the moment, irrelevant. But in addition, there is
room for there to be obligations which cannot be given any precise expression within our
language—there are surely more propositions than there are sentences in any human lan-
guage to express them. As a result, I may well have an obligation which I cannot precisely
circumscribe linguistically, and yet be able to express some of the necessary conditions for
the fulfillment of that obligation. In such cases, I need to be able to express the normative
importance of satisfying such necessary conditions. In short, we need an operator which,
when applied to a sentence B , has the effect of saying that the truth of B is a necessary
condition for the fulfillment of my obligations. Whether or not it would be appropriate to
read the resulting normative formula into English as saying that B ought to be (or ought to
be made) true, is a minor matter, not affecting the strength of the logical need for such an
operator.
This is an important point, because we also need to be able to track the causal conse-
quences of fulfilling our obligations, though it would often (perhaps even usually) be odd
and misleading to say we are obligated to bring about those causal consequences. I ought
to donate blood. An inevitable causal consequence of doing so will be that, for a short
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time, I will feel light-headed. It does not follow that we would want to say that I ought to
feel light-headed for a short time. That would be an entirely misleading way of expressing
the matter. On the other hand, neither does it follow from that that we have no need of
a deontic operator to express the place of feeling light-headed in my normative situation.
There are a variety of reasons why it is important to be able to acknowledge the causal
consequences of fulfilling obligations. For one thing, they may lead to additional obliga-
tions. Since I can expect to feel light-headed for a time after donating blood, I ought to
wait a while before driving back to work. For another, in cases in which I am faced with
conflicting obligations, and can only fulfill one, it may be that considering the alternative
causal consequences of fulfilling the various conflicting obligations will help me choose
which to honor. Again, fulfilling my obligations will have effects on other agents, and such
effects can be expected to play a role in the interactions among agents. As a result, if we
can define a two-place operator ⇒
s
with a formula like A⇒
s
B interpreted to mean that the
truth of A is (in the circumstances) a causally sufficient condition for the truth of B , then
we will also want to introduce another correspondingly quasimonotonic monadic deontic
operator, with its own quasimonotonicity rule and deontic transformation rule.
So far, I have ignored a significant consideration which makes all this less straightfor-
ward than it might seem at first: it is difficult to sort out the relationship between actions,
events and propositions. It is actions which will figure most prominently in our discussions
of personal obligations, but it is events which will figure most prominently in our analysis
of causation, and propositions which figure most prominently in our interpretation of for-
mulas. Connecting these three will be a significant challenge. This paper is intended as an
initial step in the direction of sorting out these relationships in a way that will be responsive
to the subtleties of normative discourse.
4. Models for a rich deontic logic: phase 1
By a branching temporal frame, I mean a structure 〈T ,<〉 such that:
(1) T is a nonempty set (of moments of time);
(2) < is a strict partial ordering (antisymmetric and transitive) on T .
By a forward-branching back-connected temporal frame, I mean any branching tem-
poral frame satisfying the following constraints, where we define  in terms of < in the
obvious way:
(2.1) (∀m,m1,m2 ∈ T )[m1 < m ∧ m2 < m ⇒ m1  m2 ∨ m2  m1] (no backward
branching),
(2.2) (∀m,m′ ∈ T )(∃m0 ∈ T )[m0 m∧m0 m′] (backward connection).
A history through a moment m is any subset h of T satisfying the conditions
(i) m ∈ h (through m),
(ii) (∀m1,m2 ∈ h)[m1 m2 ∨m2 m1] (connected),
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(iii) ¬(∃mω ∈ T )(∀m ∈ h)[m<mω] (complete forwards),
(iv) (∀m ∈ h)(∀m0 ∈ T )[m0 <m⇒m0 ∈ h] (complete backwards).
Given any moment m in such a frame, and any history h through m, we let H (m) be the
set of all histories through m, i.e.,
H (m) =df {h⊆ T : h satisfies constraints (i)–(iv) above}.
Nothing has been said thus far about the order type of the arrangement of moments
within histories. They might be discretely, densely, or continuously arranged, or they might
be irregularly arranged. Various such alternatives could be explored at some future time,
simply by adding appropriate constraints to produce special cases of this general approach.
Formulas will be evaluated at moment/history pairs m/h in which m ∈ h. We let M be
the set of all moment/history pairs m/h in which m ∈ h, i.e.,
M =df {m/h: m ∈ h}
and sometimes call such pairs points of evaluation. A frame becomes a model M when
it is supplemented by a valuation V assigning, at each point of evaluation m/h, to each
sentential constant S, a truth value V (m/h, S) ∈ {t,f }.
In this environment we can give satisfaction conditions for a number of useful temporal
operators. First, we have basic past and future tense operators:
(SC ) m/h,M |= A iff (∃m0 <m)[m0/h,M |= A];
(SC ) m/h,M |= A iff (∀m0 <m)[m0/h,M |= A];
(SC ) m/h,M |= A iff (∃m′ ∈ h: m<m′)[m′/h,M |= A];
(SC ) m/h,M |= A iff (∀m′ ∈ h: m<m′)[m′/h,M |= A].
Next we have temporal possibility and necessity operators:
(SC ) m/h,M |= A iff (∃h′ ∈H (m))[m/h′,M |= A];
(SC ) m/h,M |= A iff (∀h′ ∈H (m))[m/h′,M |= A].
Thomason [14] describes the operator as expressing inevitability, Burgess [8] and others
describe it as expressing historical necessity, and Belnap [2] describes it as expressing the
notion that something is “settled true”. It is important not to take this operator as expressing
either general metaphysical or logical necessity. For this reason I have chosen a symbol for
the operator that resembles, but is clearly distinct from, the one commonly used for simple
necessity.
Given any moment m and any classes K and L of moments, we extend our use of the
relation < in a natural way, so that
m<K iff (∀n ∈K)[m< n],
K <m iff (∀n ∈K)[n<m], and
K <L iff (∀m ∈K)(∀n ∈L)[m< n].
We already have the means to define a rich set of useful notions. Propositions can be
represented (in a model) by sets of points of evaluation. We let P be the set of propositions.
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Xu [15] has introduced the notion of a transition into the discussion of time, and has
shown ways in which this notion can be useful in our analysis of events, causation, and
actions. So let us turn now to the development of these notions.
By a past, we mean any class p of moments such that:
• p is nonempty, i.e., p = ∅;
• p is linear, i.e., there is some history h with p ⊂ h; and
• p is closed pastwards, i.e., whenever m< n ∈ p, we have m ∈ p.
Note that a past, as defined here, need not have a last moment.
By an outcome, we mean any class F of moments such that:
• F is nonempty, i.e., F = ∅;
• F is pastwards connected, i.e., whenever m,n ∈ F , there is some k ∈ F such that
k m and k  n; and
• F is closed futurewards, i.e., whenever m> n ∈ F , we have m ∈ F .
Note that an outcome will be a tree and so usually will not be linear. Note also that an
outcome need not have a first moment.
By a transition τ , we mean a pair τ = 〈p,F 〉 consisting of a past p, called its prologue
(Xu calls it the initial of the transition, but that term seems grammatically awkward) and an
outcome F , such that p < F , i.e., such that whenever m ∈ p and n ∈ F , we have m < n.
Note that this definition leaves room for various special cases.
immediate transitions there is no moment m such that p <m< F ;
singleton transitions there is a unique moment m such that p <m< F ;
extended transitions all other transitions.
Each transition τ uniquely determines an associated interval στ , defined as
στ =df {m: p <m< F }.
Note, however, that the converse is not true, i.e., an interval does not in general uniquely
determine an associated transition. It is entirely possible to have two (or more) transitions
which determine exactly the same interval. For one thing, there certainly can be different
immediate transitions, but any two immediate transitions will both by definition determine
the empty interval. One way this can happen is illustrated in Fig. 1 (with earlier moments
represented as to the left of later ones).
Fig. 1.
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Here the two transitions 〈p,F 1〉 and 〈p,F 2〉 are both immediate transitions, so each
is associated with the empty interval. Althoughin this illustration the two transitions share
the same prologue, that would not have to be the case when the interval is empty. Consider,
for example, a transition whose prologue has only the first two moments at the left of
Fig. 1, and whose outcome has the five moments of the upper branch of that diagram. This
too will be an immediate transition, with an empty interval—the same interval shared by
the transitions shown. There are less trivial ways that distinct transitions can determine the
same interval. Fig. 2 illustrates one such. Here the two transitions 〈p,F 1〉 and 〈p,F 2〉 both
determine the interval consisting of the two moments depicted on the same horizontal line
as p. We could vary the situation to make it more exotic. F 1 could remain as depicted, but
F 2 altered to have no first moment; or the interval might have no first or last moment; or
the prologue p might have no last moment; there might be even more than two transitions
determining the same interval, etc.
Note, too, that the outcome does not by itself determine a transition. The same outcome
can be associated with different pasts, i.e., different portions of its past, and each such
pairing will constitute a different transition. The transition from the stone age to the com-
puter age and the transition from the Victorian era to the computer age are rather different
transitions, though the one in a sense encompasses the other.
The fact that two transitions—even two non-immediate transitions—can determine the
same interval makes transitions more sensitive than intervals as a means for representing
processes. We might well wish to associate a given process with one transition, yet not
associate it with another transition whose interval is the same, because we might want the
outcome of the process to be one of its identifying features. A fortiori, transitions are more
sensitive than moments by themselves would be.
The fact that transitions may or may not be immediate also makes them more suitable
than intervals or bare moments as a tool for representing events. Some events, we may sup-
pose, are drawn out in time. For such events, there will be associated extended transitions,
with the prologue, or past, of the transition corresponding to that period of time before
the event has occurred, the interval corresponding to that portion of time during which the
event is occurring, and the outcome corresponding to that portion of time by which the
event has already occurred. Some events, however, may well occur at a particular moment,
and for such events, there will be singleton transitions. Finally, some events may occur in-
stantaneously, marking the boundary between times at which A is true and times at which
it is not; such instantaneous events will be associated with immediate transitions. It is com-
mon, in discussions of events, to choose just one of these three categories of events, and
proceed as though all events fell into that one category. Basing our understanding of events
on the notion of a transition can help avoid such oversimplification.
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We might consider letting events be represented by single transitions. But it often seems
reasonable to say that under slightly altered circumstances, the same event would have oc-
curred. For example, I recently borrowed a book from the library. Suppose I try to represent
that event by a single transition, with a unique prologue leading up to my borrowing the
book, a unique interval during which I borrowed it, and a unique outcome within which
it could be said truly that I had borrowed it. But shortly before the period when I had the
book on loan, someone in Brunei was exercising her free will, choosing what to have for
a midnight snack, and thus affecting the course of history. Various branches of time result
from various choices she might make, and some of those branches deviate from the pro-
logue of my favored transition. Are we to say that if she had made a different choice than
in fact she did, then this event of my borrowing the book would not have occurred? We
could say that, of course, and maintain that although I might still have borrowed this book,
the event of doing so would have been a different event, though of a similar (or even the
same) kind.
But this seems far more fine-grained than our ordinary discourse would suggest was
appropriate. Moreover, as Xu [15, p. 152] points out, we sometimes wish to say that under
certain conditions an event may become inevitable, and would not want to retract this
because of causally irrelevant co-occurrent circumstances. Sitting in my office in Syracuse,
I drop a book. Under the local conditions, it becomes inevitable that the book will fall to the
floor. We do not want to retract this judgment because of the possibility that a radium atom
on the moon might decay just as the book begins to slip from my hand, or that someone
in Brunei might at that moment be freely choosing something for a snack. If we want to
say that this event, and not just that an event of this kind, was (under the circumstances)
inevitable then we must be prepared to accept that various transitions would count equally
as occurrences of this same event.
Here is a slightly different way of looking at the matter. We will want to be able to
say that sometimes one event causes another. Although constant conjunction may not be
an adequate sufficient condition for causation, something like it will surely be a necessary
condition. But a condition of constant conjunction will be trivially satisfied by any two
events that occur in the same history, if events are simply single transitions. If, on the other
hand, events are appropriately chosen classes of transitions, then constant conjunction be-
comes a meaningful notion: we can expect the transitions of the cause will be constantly
conjoined with transitions from the effect. This consideration was already at play just be-
neath the surface in our talk of inevitability a moment ago.
We say that a transition τ = 〈p,F 〉 occurs in history h iff h runs through τ , i.e., iff
h ∩ F = ∅. It is tempting to write that h ∈ F in such a case, but this would be literally
false; F will be a (structured) set of moments, not of histories, and indeed won’t include
all the moments of any history. Since we will have frequent occasion to speak of a history
as running through an outcome, or a transition, it will be convenient to have some briefer
notation for this, however, i.e., some notation that does not require tiresomely bringing the
empty set into view each time, so I will write that h ε F and h ε τ .
h ε F iff h∩F = ∅,
h ε τ iff (∃p,F )[τ = 〈p,F 〉 & h ε F ].
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Note that in any such case p ⊂ h, but that this by itself is not enough to assure that h ε τ ,
since there can be other transitions with the same interval, and hence with the same pro-
logue p.
In the spirit of abbreviating h∩F = ∅ by writing that h ε F , I also let p ε F abbreviate
p ∩F = ∅, where p is any past. Indeed, I will also write that p′ ε τ when τ = 〈p,F 〉 and
p′ ε F .
p ε F iff p ∩F = ∅,
p′ ε τ iff (∃p,F )[τ = 〈p,F 〉 & p′ ε F ].
When a history runs through two transitions, it will sometimes be difficult to find a
basis for saying that either transition comes before the other, because the two may overlap
in confusing ways. But often we will have a basis for ordering them and, particularly in
connection with discussions of causation, will wish to do so. For transitions τ and τ ′, we
can define the notion that τ precedes τ ′, recorded by writing that τ  τ ′, as follows:
τ  τ ′ iff p′ ε F , where τ = 〈p,F 〉 and τ ′ = 〈p′,F ′〉.
Note that this assures the irreflexivity and transitivity of the relation.
Assume for the moment that an event η is, or is associated with, a class of transitions.
For simplicity of expression, let’s just speak of the event as consisting of the set of associ-
ated transitions. Then it is natural to say that:
Event η occurs in history h
iff h runs through some transition associated with η, i.e.,
iff for some transition τ = 〈p,F 〉 ∈ η, h ε τ.
In such a case we will write that h ε η by analogy with earlier notation, and sometimes say
that η occurs in history h with transition τ . Given a moment m in a history h and given an
event η, we can also say that:
at m/h: η is occurring iff (∃τ = 〈p,F 〉 ∈ η)[h ε F & m ∈ στ ];
at m/h: η has occurring iff (∃τ = 〈p,F 〉 ∈ η)[h ε F & m ∈ F ];
at m/h: η will occur iff (∃τ = 〈p,F 〉 ∈ η)[h ε F & m ∈ p].
Xu [15] proposes that an event is (or at least corresponds to) a class of transitions, but that
there are limitations on what classes of transitions can count as corresponding to a single
event. In particular, a single event (as contrasted with events of a given kind) cannot occur
twice in the same history. We can capture that requirement by saying that the collection
of transitions corresponding to a single event must be such that no history runs through
two different transitions of the collection. I propose to accept this for now and just identify
an event with a class of transitions meeting this constraint. Note that this is akin to taking
propositions to be classes of points of evaluation. No doubt this is too coarse-grained an
approach to serve all purposes, but it is good enough to serve a surprisingly large range of
purposes. I will
let E be the class of all events (in the model).
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If events η and η′ both occur in history h, with transitions τ and τ ′, respectively, then we
can say that η′ comes after η in h iff τ  τ ′. In such a case we will write that η  η′ [h].
At a given moment, given the way the past has proceeded up to that point, an event
can become inevitable or become impossible, i.e., it might occur in all, or in none, of the
histories through that past. But it might also be contingent, occurring in some but not all
such histories. I.e., for any past p and any event η, we say that η is contingent at p if η
later occurs in at least one, but not in every, h through p.
With this account of events in place, we can also give an account of event-causation.
Here Xu notes a subtlety that is commonly overlooked in ordinary discourse. When we
say that one event causes another, the situation is usually a bit more complex than that.
Normally there are background conditions in the presence of which the one event causes
the other, but without which such a causal connection might not occur. For one thing, if an
event η is followed by an event η′, but the event η′ was already inevitable even before η
occurred, we would not want to say the first causes the second. But also, in saying that η
caused η′, we are normally suppressing all mention of a host of enabling conditions and
circumstances. Flipping the light switch caused the light to glow, given that the wiring was
set up in an appropriate way, and there was an appropriate source of electricity. But the
enabling conditions will already be in place before the first event takes place, and thus can
be represented by some appropriate earlier past p0. Putting various considerations together,
then, we can say that, for events η and η′, and past p0,
η is causally sufficient for η′ with respect to p0 iff:
(i) both η and η′ are contingent at p0; and
(ii) for each h with p0 ⊂ h, if η occurs in h with transition τ,
then η′ occurs in h with some transition τ ′ such that τ  τ ′;
η is causally necessary for η′ with respect to p0 iff:
(i) η′ is contingent at p0; and
(ii) for each η′-transition τ ′ = 〈p′,F ′〉 with p0 < F ′, and for each h ε F ′,
there is an η-transition τ = 〈p,F 〉 occurring in h, such that
p0 < F , and
τ  τ ′.
We can combine these notions, of course. Xu shows that the result is equivalent to the
following very natural definition:
η is causally necessary and sufficient for η′ with respect to p0 iff:
(i) both η and η′ are contingent at p0, and
(ii) for each h with p0 ⊂ h, η occurs in h iff η′ occurs in h, and
(iii) for each h with p0 ⊂ h, η  η′ [h],
i.e., for each such h, η′ comes after η in h, i.e.,
if η occurs in h with transition τ
and η′ occurs in h with transition τ ′, then τ  τ ′.
M.A. Brown / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 19–37 31
With these tools at our disposal, let us turn to the task of providing for actions, which we
take to be events constituted by, or more or less directly resulting from, choices made by
agents.
5. Models for a rich deontic logic: phase 2
For any moment m, let F (m) be the set of all outcomes immediately following m.
By a choice frame, I mean a structure 〈T ,<,A,C〉 in which 〈T ,<〉 is a forward-
branching back-connected temporal frame, and
(3) A is a nonempty set (of agents); and
(4) C (the choice function) provides, for each agent α and each moment m, a partition
C(α,m) of F (m) into non-vacuous choices, i.e., a partition such that:
(∀m ∈ T )(∀c ∈ C(α,m))(∃F ∈ F (m))[F ∈ c] (non-vacuity).
In previous work (mine and that of Belnap and others) the choice function C(α,m) has
been conceived as yielding a partition of H (m) of histories through m, subject to a restric-
tion that there be “no choice between undivided histories”. But this amounts to the same
thing as saying that it yields a partition of F (m), and this latter way of thinking is more
appropriate to our present projects.
To form a model, we add a valuation V , as before. But now our syntax will contain new
non-logical constants, serving as names of agents, and so the valuation must also assign an
agent V (a) from A to each such agentive constant a.
In this environment we can give satisfaction conditions for a number of action oper-
ators. These are essentially stit operators of the sort defined and discussed by Horty and
Belnap [12], where stit is an acronym for sees to it that: However I find it convenient to
substitute a more compact and iconic notation, using variants on the Greek  (to evoke the
verb ‘do’). Each such operator will be relativized to some agent via a subscripted agent-
name a. Again, formulas are evaluated at moment/history pairs (in a model M).
First we have what Horty and Belnap call the cstit, or Chellas stit, operator , drawn
from Chellas [9,10]:
(SC ) m/h,M |= aA iff (∃c ∈C(V (a),m): h ∈ c)(∀h′ ∈ c)[m/h′,M |= A].
Next, we have what they call the dstit, or deliberative stit, operator, introduced in [11]:
(SC ) m/h,M |= aA iff (∃c ∈C(V (a),m): h ∈ c)(∀h′ ∈ c)[m/h′,M |= A] & (∃h′′ ∈
H (m))[m/h′′,M  A],
i.e., iff m/h,M |= aA & m/h,M  A,
i.e., iff m/h,M |= aA ∧¬ A.
The first conjunct here is the positive condition, namely that the choice made by the agent
assure the truth of A, while the second conjunct is the negative condition, namely this
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outcome not already have been assured independently of the agent’s choice. a is a non-
monotonic operator, intended to be used with an expression of the precise content of the
agent’s action. a is a monotonic operator, and can be used with any logical consequence
of that content. As I have argued above, both are important. But we would be well served
if we also had quasimonotonic operators that could be used with the causal conditions and
the causal consequences of the agent’s choice.
It is interesting to notice that there is an event ηαm/h naturally associated with an agent α
at a moment history pair m/h, namely the set of singleton transitions whose prologues are
the part pm of h prior to m, and whose outcomes are the various outcomes in the choice c
from C(α,m) through which h runs. Each such transition will have the singleton set {m}
as its interval. That event, whether or not there is a formula which precisely characterizes
its outcome, can be thought of as that agent’s basic action at that point of evaluation.
(This is, of course, quite a different usage of ‘basic action’ from that usually found in the
literature of the philosophy of action.) It could equally well be described as the agent’s
choice (construed as an action) at that point of evaluation.
It is natural to seek an operator applicable to the causal consequences of that event.
Suppose an agent’s basic action ηαm/h is causally sufficient for some further event η
′
, with
respect to the past pm. In such a case I will write that ηαm/h  η′. By the relevant definitions,
this will mean that
(i) both ηαm/h and η′ are contingent with respect to pm; and
(ii) in each history h′ through the basic action ηαm/h there will be some transition τ ′ =
〈p′,F ′〉 ∈ η′ such that
(iia) h also runs through τ ′, i.e., h ε F ′, and
(iib) p′ contains at least one moment m′ such that m <m′ (so that τ ′ is an appropri-
ately later transition).
In such a case, as with any event, there may or may not be some formula which exactly
expresses the outcome of the event, but there will often be formulas which express relevant
aspects of that outcome. In particular, there may be a formula A which will be true at the
opening of each of the outcomes of that event that was not true at the close of any of its
prologues. Since an outcome may not have a first moment, to say that A is true at the
opening of an outcome F ′ is to say that it is true throughout some initial interval (possibly
of only a moment’s duration, if there is a first moment). Let us introduce the notation
F |A to express the claim that A is true at the opening of outcome F . We can define the
notion as follows:
F |A iff (∀h ε F )(∃m ∈ h∩F )(∀m′ ∈ F : m′ m)[m′/h |= A].
Similarly, when we have a transition τ = 〈p,F 〉, we can we define the notion that A is true
at the opening of the outcome F of τ as follows:
τ |A iff F |A.
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Analogously, let us introduce the notation τ |A to express the claim that the formula A is
true at the close of the prologue p of a transition τ .
τ |A iff (∃m ∈ p)(∀m′ ∈ p: mm′)(∀h ε τ)[m′/h |= A].
Using these, we can define the notion of a transition’s bringing about the truth of a formula.
For any transition τ = 〈p,F 〉:
τ |≈A iff τ |¬A & τ |A.
Given some moment m prior to such a transition, it will also be helpful to be able to specify
that the formula in question isn’t true at m and doesn’t become true in the transition until
we reach its outcome.
m, τ ‖≈A iff τ |≈A & m ∈ p & (∀m′ ∈ p: mm′)(∀h ε F )[m′/h |= ¬A].
Further, we can introduce analogous notions involving propositions, rather than formulas.
Given a proposition S ∈ P and a transition τ = 〈p,F 〉, and letting ∼S be the negation
(complement) of the proposition S:
F |S iff (∀h ε F )(∃m ∈ h∩F )(∀m′ ∈ F : m′ m)[m′/h ∈ S],
τ |S iff F |S,
τ |S iff (∃m ∈ p)(∀m′ ∈ p: mm′)(∀h ε τ)[m′/h ∈ S],
τ |≈S iff τ |∼S & F |S,
m, τ ‖≈S iff τ ‖≈S & m ∈ p & (∀m′ ∈ p: mm′)(∀h ε F )[m′/h /∈ S].
Then we can introduce an action upshot operator that is quasimonotonic with respect to
causal consequence as follows:
(SC ) m/h,M |= aA iff (∃η ∈E: ηV (a)m/h  η)(∀h′ ε ηV (a)m/h )(∃τ ∈ η: h ε τ)[m, τ ‖≈A].(Recall that E is the class of all events.)
This will be applicable in cases in which although A doesn’t express precisely what the
agent is doing, nor any logical consequence of what the agent is doing, it does express one
of the causally unavoidable consequences of that action.
Now let us turn to causal conditions. Suppose an agent’s basic action ηαm/h is causally
necessary for some further event η′, with respect to the past pm. In such a case I will
write that ηαm/h ≺ η′. In such situations, if the formula A expresses an aspect of the out-
come of η′, we may wish to say that it expresses something α is now doing, even though
it isn’t what α is doing strictly speaking. You see me walking towards the library and
ask what I’m doing. I reply that I’m returning a book. Of course there is still plenty
of opportunity to change my mind and veer off to some other destination, so it is not
yet assured that I will return the book. But what I am doing now—strictly speaking, just
walking towards the library—is a causally necessary part of, and is motivated by, a larger
project.
By the relevant definitions, we will have ηαm/h ≺ η′ iff:
(i) η′ is contingent with respect to pm; and
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(ii) for each η′-transition τ ′ = 〈p′,F ′〉 with pm < F ′, and for each h ε F ′, there is an
ηαm/h-transition τ = 〈pm,F 〉 with h ε F , such that τ  τ ′.
Now we can introduce an action requirement operator that is quasimonotonic with respect
to causal conditions as follows:
(SC ) m/h,M |= aA iff (∃η ∈E: ηαm/h ≺ η)(∀h′ ε η)(∃τ ∈ η: h′ ε τ)[m, τ ‖≈A].
We can also introduce causal connectives which indicate causal relations between
propositions. For propositions R and S, and relative to a point m/h, I will write that
R →
s
S[m/h] to indicate that (at m/h) R is a causally sufficient condition for S (R pro-
duces S) and write that R →
n
S[m/h] to indicate that (at m/h) S is a causally necessary
condition for R (R requires S). I propose that to say that R →
s
S[m/h] is to say that both
R and S are contingent at m/h, and that in all those histories through m in which R,
though not true at m, becomes true, it subsequently happens that S, though not true at m,
becomes true as well. In short:
R →
s
S[m/h] iff
(i) (∃h′ ∈H (m))(∀m′ ∈ h′: mm′)[m′/h′ /∈R], and
(ii) (∃h′ ∈H (m))(∃m′ ∈ h′: m< m′)[m′/h′ ∈R], and
(iii) (∃h′ ∈H (m))(∀m′ ∈ h′: mm′)[m′/h′ /∈ S], and
(iv) (∃h′ ∈H (m))(∃m′ ∈ h′: m< m′)[m′/h′ ∈ S], and
(v) (∃m′ ∈ T )(∃h′ ∈H (m′))[m′/h′ ∈R & m′/h′ /∈ S]
(vi) (∀h′ ∈H (m))[(∃τ = 〈p,F 〉: m ∈ p ⊂ h)[m, τ ‖≈R]
⇒ (∃τ ′ = 〈p′,F ′〉: τ  τ ′ & m ∈ p′ ⊂ h′)[m, τ ′ ‖≈S]].
This makes it possible to introduce a corresponding binary connective into the syntax.
(SC⇒
s
) m/h,M |= A ⇒
s
B iff ‖A‖ →
s
‖B‖[m/h],
where ‖A‖ is the proposition expressed by A, i.e., (m/h ∈ M)[m/h |= A], and similarly
for ‖B‖.
In similar fashion, I suggest that:
R →
n
S[m/h] iff
(i) (∃h′ ∈H (m))(∀m′ ∈ h′: mm′)[m′/h′ /∈R], and
(ii) (∃h′ ∈H (m))(∃m′ ∈ h′: m< m′)[m′/h′ ∈R], and
(iii) (∃m′ ∈ T )(∃h′ ∈H (m′))[m′/h′ ∈R & m′/h′ /∈ S]
(iv) (∀h′ ∈H (m))[(∃τ = 〈p, F 〉: m ∈ p ⊂ h)[m, τ ‖≈R]
⇒ (∃τ ′ = 〈p′,F ′〉: τ ′  τ & m ∈ p′ ⊂ h)[m, τ ′ ‖≈S]].
This makes it possible to introduce the following connective into the syntax.
(SC⇒
n
) m/h,M |= A ⇒
n
B iff ‖A‖ →
n
‖B‖[m/h].
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6. Models for a rich deontic logic: phase 3By a diachronic deontic frame, I mean a structure 〈T ,<,A,C,O〉 in which the struc-
ture 〈T ,<,A,C〉 is a choice frame, and
(5) O (the obligation function) is a function from moment/history pairs to sets of propo-
sitions, i.e., from M to PP .
(As usual, we add a valuation V to the frame to create a model.) This treatment of the
obligation function calls for a little comment. For reasons explored in [7], I treat oblig-
ations as fundamentally impersonal, and take a personal obligation of an agent α to be
the impersonal obligation that a certain event take place, namely α’s performing a certain
action. Hence the function does not have agents as arguments; instead the agent appears,
when needed, as an argument in the specification of an obligatory action.
The obligation function will be subject to a number of constraints which limitations of
space prevent us from considering fully here. Some of these constraints have been indicated
and discussed in [4–7]. To put the matter briefly, we may distinguish (at least) between
standing obligations and dischargeable obligations, the former persisting even as we abide
by them, the latter ceasing to exist if and when we take appropriate action. For both sorts
we will want constraints to secure the following features:
• events which are obligatory should be contingent;
• actions should not be obligatory when it is impossible to perform them.
For dischargeable obligations, we will also want something like the following features:
• dischargeable obligations should cease to exist when discharged;
• they should persist until discharged or until they can no longer be fulfilled.
In what follows, I focus on the treatment of dischargeable obligations.
We can give satisfaction conditions for a basic impersonal obligation operator © as
follows:
(SC©) m/h,M |= ©A iff ‖A‖ ∈O(m/h),
where ‖A‖ is the proposition expressed by A, i.e., the set of moment/history pairs at which
A is satisfied. This gives us the basic nonmonotonic impersonal obligation operator we
need, and it can be combined with personal action operators to provide for personal oblig-
ations. So, for example, we can get the effect of a personal obligation operator by using the
modality © a .
But we are also in a position to give satisfaction conditions for a monotonic impersonal
obligation operator like the one in SDL:
(SC ) m/h,M |= A iff (∃o ∈O(m/h))(∀m′/h′ ∈ o: m<m′)[m′/h′,M |= A].
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This, too, can be used with an action operator to get the effect of a personal obligation
operator.
But because of the detailed work on actions and causation that phase 2 has made possi-
ble, we are also in a position to provide some quasimonotonic obligation operators. Recall
that obligations are (represented by) propositions that ought to become true. So we can
introduce a quasimonotonic obligation consequence operator which preserves inferences
under causal consequence, as follows:
(SC ) m/h,M |= A iff (∃o ∈O(m/h))[o →
s
‖A‖[m/h]].
Similarly, we can introduce a quasimonotonic obligation requirement operator which
preserves inferences to causally necessary preconditions, as follows:
(SC ) m/h,M |= A iff (∃o ∈O(m/h))[o →
n
‖A‖[m/h]].
As in other cases, these impersonal obligation operators make it possible to provide per-
sonal obligation modalities by making use of appropriate action operators.
7. Summary
We have made a bare beginning at uncovering possible candidates for useful deontic
operators. I do not claim to have found the right way to define these notions, nor to have
uncovered all the important related concepts involved in normative discourse, but I hope at
least to have made it clear that there are rich possibilities here that cry out for exploration
and exploitation.
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